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Securing of Resources as a Valid Reason for Using Force? – 
A Pre-Emptive Defence of the Prohibition on the Use of Force* 
 




A growing demand for natural resources embedded in current changes of the international order 
will put pressure on states to secure the future availability of these resources. Some political 
discourses suggest that states might respond by challenging the foundations of international law. 
Whereas the UN Charter was inter alia aimed at eliminating uses of force for economic reasons, one 
may observe an on-going trend of securitization of matters of resource supply resulting into the 
revival of self-preservation doctrines. The chapter will show that those claims lack a normative 
foundation in the current framework of the prohibition of the use of force. Moreover, international 
law has sufficient instruments to cope with disputes over access to resources by other means than 
the use of force. The international community, therefore, must oppose claims that may contribute to 
normative uncertainties and strengthen already existing instruments of pacific settlement of 
disputes. 
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In its 2010 Global Strategic Trends report, the UK Ministry of Defence forecasted that  
“[t]he issue of energy security is one in which governments, and defence organizations, will 
increasingly have to be engaged if states are to maintain their standards of living, and to 
ensure adequate supplies of natural resources, at reasonable prices. States who perceive 
that energy security is impacting on national survival are likely to challenge conventional 
interpretations on the legality of the use of force. However, the cornerstone of the UN 
Charter, which prohibits the threat, or use, of force in international relations, will remain 
firmly in place.”3  
In an ambivalent language the report suggests that, in view of a changing security environment, the 
prohibition on the use of force may undergo interpretative shifts which threaten to affect its 
normative strength. The general expectation that the prohibition of the use of force, as well as its 
steering function, will be undermined in years to come is formulated more explicitly in the 2018 
Global Strategic Trends report where it is stated that  
“[c]hanges to laws governing the use of force in international relations are […] expected over 
the coming decades. […] The general prohibition on the use of force is almost certain to 
remain in place, but it may be progressively challenged and narrowed in scope. This could in 
turn lead to increased tensions and a greater tendency to resort to military action to settle 
disputes.“4 
This assessment written for the purposes of strategic government policies reflects current 
discussions in academic discourse. While most academic observers hold that, despite certain 
contestations, the prohibition of the use of force remains unchallenged in its legal validity,5 some 
point to indications for an erosion of the prohibition. Different strands of challenges intersect, 
seriously threatening to undermine the prohibition on the use of force. From a legal perspective, 
such a process of norm erosion consists of various legally relevant phenomena which reduce the 
legal effects of a prohibition. For example, restrictive readings of the constitutive elements of a 
prohibition as well as extensive readings of its exceptions may reduce its scope and thereby its 
legal effects.6 Pertinent cases concern efforts to establish a broad interpretation of the right of 
self-defence against non-state actors as an exception to the prohibition on the use of force which 
threatens to swallow the rule. The same applies to new threats resulting from modern technologies 
and growing dependency on the cyber-space that have the potential to fundamentally change the 
                                                        
3  Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme, 
https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/GST4_v9_Feb10.
pdf, 25.04.2019 (107). 
4  DCDC, Global Strategic Trends – The Future Starts Today, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/771309/Global_Strategic_Trends_-_The_Future_ 
Starts_Today.pdf, 25.04.2019 (130). 
5 See e.g. Marxsen, Violation and confirmation of the law: the intricate effects of the invocation of the law in 
armed conflict, in: Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 2018, 8 – 39; Gray, International Law and 
the Use of Force, 2018, 26 et seqq.; Henderson, The Use of Force and International Law, 2018, 47. 
6 Cf. Krieger/Liese, A Metamorphosis of International Law?: Value Changes in the International Legal Order 
From the Perspectives of Legal and Political Science, 2019, 12; Aust/Payandeh, Praxis und Protest im 
Völkerrecht: Erosionserscheinungen des völkerrechtlichen Gewaltverbots und die Verantwortung der 
Bundesrepublik im Syrien-Konflikt, in: JZ 2018, 635 et seqq. 




prohibition of the use of force in general as the 2018 UK report predicts.7 Also, more expansive 
readings of Art. 39 UN Charter will at least have an indirect impact on Art. 2 (4) UN Charter by 
potentially opening more and more policy areas to military solutions.  
Within the context of global resource allocation and scarcity, another process of erosion of the 
prohibition of the use of force starts to emerge. Whilst interstate conflicts arguably always had 
been linked to resources and securing trade, the acquisition of resources had mostly neither been 
the primary purpose nor been advanced as a legal justification for a conflict. However, the effects 
of climate change and a rise of global demand for certain resources may render securing natural 
resources into a primary reason for waging war. For example, UN-Water forecasts a rise of people 
living in water-scarce areas from 3.6 to 4.8-5.7 billion.8 At the same time, water resources are rarely 
a domestic good but to a large extent shared among two or more states requiring long-term 
cooperation.9 On the demand side, the expected establishment of “new global players” such as 
China and India with a fast-growing economy as well as a growing population will increase the 
need for resources. For strategic sources, such as oil, the existence of a peak in demand is 
controversially debated, yet expected by many.10  
While international law has developed frameworks to manage the scarcity of resources through 
instruments of bi- or multilateral cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes, where 
cooperation seems unlikely, violent disputes over territory and investments may rise. According to 
the 2018 Conflict Barometer of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 
resources are the second leading cause for conflicts after “system & ideology” with a total number 
of 62 conflicts ranging from low-intensity conflicts to fully-fledged armed conflicts.11 Parties to such 
conflicts may try to justify the use of force to secure “their” resources, challenging traditional 
understandings of the prohibition of the use of force as the prognosis of the 2010 UK Global 
Strategic Trends report suggests. 
This chapter will examine whether there are indications in state practice and legal discourse for a 
creeping erosion of the prohibition on the use of force in relation to conflicts over natural 
resources. It will be shown that the absolute prohibition of the use of force under the UN Charter, 
inter alia, was aimed to ban specifically these types of armed conflicts. In a second step, the 
chapter will analyse how norm erosion is fostered and will assess such processes against the 
backdrop of the legal framework of the ius ad bellum.12 
 
                                                        
7  DCDC, Global Strategic Trends – The Future Starts Today, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/771309/Global_Strategic_Trends_-_The_Future_ 
Starts_Today.pdf, 25.04.2019 (130). 
8 UN-Water, The United Nations World Water Development Report 2018, 2018, 3. 
9 International river basins cover 45.3 percent of the earth’s land surface, affect about 40 percent of the 
world’s population, and account for approximately 80 percent of global river flows, see FAO, Transboundary 
Waters, http://www.fao.org/land-water/water/water-management/transboundary-water-management/en/, 
25.04.2019. 
10 The so called “Hubbert's peak” refers to the point at which this production rate is at its highest with demand 
for the resource rising, and after this it predicts a drop in correlation to the increased demand. Recent 
forecast by DNV GL, Energy Transition Outlook 2018, 2018, 27: “We predict peak oil in 2023, with gas to follow in 
2036. Coal has already peaked.” On the contrary, the IEA, Oil 2019 – Analysis and forecast to 2024, 2019, p. 3: 
“[…] there is no peak demand on the horizon”. 
11 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2018, 2019, 16. 
12 This chapter will limit itself to the ius ad bellum framework against state actors, leaving aside especially the 
ius ad bellum relationship to non-state actors and the ius in bello framework. 




2. Banning Resource Conflicts by Banning Measures Short of War 
The absolute prohibition of the use of force under the UN Charter and its aim to specifically ban 
armed conflicts over natural resources must be read against the backdrop of state practice of the 
late 18th and early 20th century. Access and securing of resources served, alongside an alleged 
mission to civilize the world, as an authorization of the use of force towards “non-civilized 
people”.13 In the context of colonialization, measures to secure resources and foreign investments 
without an occupation of territory would have likely been characterized as “police measures” or 
“measures short of war”.14 “Measures short of war” were defined as one-sided acts of war in the 
sense of material armed clashes without the intention of a state of war.15 In the form of reprisals, 
they were seen as a form of self-help that allowed the resort to military force against unlawful 
acts.16 In the form of necessity they served to protect a fundamental value of a state, in particular 
its survival.17 These measures were linked to the overall environment of a developing global 
economy and the spirit of imperialism prevalent in that era. As an early example, a UK council 
order of 1795 allowed cruisers to seize and detain all vessels, laden, wholly or in part with corn, 
flour, meal, and other articles of provisions, which were bound for any port in France, and to send 
them to ports in the UK where the load could be purchased by the government. The UK justified 
these measures before a UK-US Maritime Claims Commission, inter alia, on the grounds of 
necessity, since the country was threatened by a scarcity of such resources.18 Moreover, “Western” 
countries used armed interventions for the protection of foreign investments in South America and 
East Asia as “measures short of war”, in the form of armed reprisals against alleged wrongdoings.19 
For instance, the US, in defending its influence over the (South)-American states, followed such an 
interventionist approach formulated by the former US President Roosevelt in the so-called 
Roosevelt-Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.20  
After World War I, although the 1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact, in its Art. 1, condemned recourse to war, 
those measures were not fully outlawed because the pact lacked a definition of self-defence and 
left its assessment to the invoking state.21 During the negotiations, the UK expressly made a 
reservation for actions against interference in “certain regions of the world the welfare and 
integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety”.22 The motive for 
this reservation was to make clear that self-defence covers securing access to India via 
                                                        
13 von Bernstorff, The Use of Force in International Law before World War I, in: EJIL 2018, 245. 
14 von Bernstorff, The Use of Force in International Law before World War I, in: EJIL 2018, 241 et seq., 248. 
15 Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 2005, 173, 175. 215 et seqq. 
16 Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 2005, 226. 
17 Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 2005, 240. 
18 Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 1916, 724 et seqq. 
19 von Bernstorff, The Use of Force in International Law before World War I, in: EJIL 2018, 242. 
20  Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress, 6 December 1904, www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?ash=true 
&doc=56&page=transcript, 25.04.2019. 
21 This is indicated in the travaux préparatoires, see: Note by Mr. Atherton to Sir Austen Chamberlaine from 
23rd June 1928, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbbr.asp#no1, 25.04.2019: “Every nation is free at all 
times and regardless of treaty provisions, to defend its territories from attack or invasion, and it alone is 
competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defence.” 
22 Chamberlain, Note of 19 May 1928, cited after: Lesaffer, Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928, in: Wolfrum, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2010, para. 12. 




interventions in vital regions such as Egypt, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf where no other great 
power should gain influence.23 
Shortly before and during World War II, the war over resources was finally culminating in the 
absence of a clear prohibition. Japan argued that it was being economically strangled by US 
sanctions resulting from its invasion of Manchuria and French Indochina. It claimed that it was left 
with no other choice than to preserve its military advantage by attacking the US in Pearl Harbor 
and was therefore justified to wage war in the Pacific.24 However, the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East rejected this justification.25 Even before, the Assembly of the League of Nations 
refused to accept that the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 in reaction to a Chinese 
economic boycott of Japan could be considered as legitimate self-defence.26 
The paradigm shift to an absolute prohibition of the use of force was brought about by the drafters 
of the UN Charter which aimed at limiting self-defence for economic reasons. In the literature it is 
argued that the drafters had the Axis powers in mind, and the excuse those states had used. Both 
powers had made self-defence claims in the World War II: Lebensraum in the case of Germany, and 
access to natural resources in the case of Japan.27  
Securing access to resources using force against another country would now clearly constitute a 
violation of the prohibition of the use of force in Art. 2 (4) UN Charter and under customary 
international law.28 Art. 2 (4) UN Charter proscribes the “threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations”. The use of military force to acquire economic resources or 
territory of another state clearly constitutes such a case.29 The historical exemption for “measures 
short of war” that do contain uses of force without the intent of occupation is no longer accepted 
under the UN Charter. “Territorial integrity or political independence” is not to be understood as 
restricting the application of the use of force, but setting out examples for certain violations.30 At 
an early stage, the ICJ strengthened this understanding and rejected arguments for “measures 
short of war” in the Corfu Channel Case, arguing that 
“[…] the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in 
the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present 
defects in international organization, find a place in international law. [Such] [i]ntervention 
                                                        
23 McKercher, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924–1929: Attitudes and Diplomacy, 
1984, 117 et seq. citing an explanation of the motivation by former UK Foreign Minister Chamberlaine. 
24 Röling/Rüter, The Tokyo Judgement – The International Military Tribunal for the Far East – 29 April 1946 – 12 
November 1948, Vol. II, 1977, 616. 
25 Röling/Rüter, The Tokyo Judgement – The International Military Tribunal for the Far East – 29 April 1946 – 12 
November 1948, Vol. I, 1977, 380 – 381; Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence, in: Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 1961, 220.  
26 League of Nations, League of Nations Assembly Report on the Sino-Japanese Dispute, in: AJIL 1933, 
Supplement: Official Documents, 145 – 146. 
27 O’Connel/Niyatzmatov, What is Aggression, in: JICJ 2012, 193. 
28 ICJ, Judgement, 26.11.1984, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), ICJ Reports 1984, 424 – 425. 
29 See e.g. Saul/Kinley/Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2014, 105. 
30 Cf. Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence, in: Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 1961, 235. 




would be reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the 
administration of international justice itself.”31  
Thereby, the ICJ acknowledged that “measures short of war” were no longer a permissible 
exception to the prohibition of the use of force and closed the option for unilaterally securing 
natural resources or protecting trade interests through military means. 
Despite the absolute prohibition of the use of force, attempts to justify military intervention on the 
basis of securing access to resources continued, following the logic of “measures short of war”.32 In 
1956, for example, the nationalization of the Suez Canal resulted in the Suez crisis over securing 
access to resources through the Suez Canal and finally led to France, the UK, and Israel attacking 
Egypt. While UN member states accused France and the UK of a flagrant violation of international 
law33 both states argued to have a legitimate claim of securing access to resources. They described 
their intervention as an “emergency police force” to protect the Suez Canal which did not aim at 
affecting the sovereignty of Egypt.34 As another case in point, during the Oil Crisis in 1973, the US 
publicly considered seizing oil fields in the Persian Gulf. In an interview, US State Secretary 
Kissinger replied to a question, whether the US considered the use of military force in response to 
the embargo:  
“I am not saying that there’s no circumstance where we would not use force. But it is one 
thing to use it in the case of a dispute over price; it’s another where there is some actual 
strangulation of the industrialized world.”35  
This response implied that there are military options in case of an “actual strangulation”. 
More specifically, scholars currently observe an all-time high of conflicts over water resources 
under the keyword “water wars”. The term “water wars” usually describes a broad conflict over 
shared water resources, ranging from a shared ocean, shared rivers or basins to shared 
groundwater resources. The concept covers military as well as non-military conflicts. Despite 
criticism that, until now, in modern times, no inter-state conflict had been carried out by military 
means solely based on access to water,36 words and behaviour of states suggest the opposite: most 
recently, tensions arose again between India and Pakistan over withdrawal from the Indus Water 
Treaty, governing the share of each nation in the transboundary rivers.37 Moreover, violent conflicts 
                                                        
31 ICJ, Judgement, 9.4.1949, Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. 
Albania), ICJ Reports 1949, 35. 
32 See e.g. Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence, in: Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 1961, 213. 
33 See UNGA, Record of the Meetings, United Nations General Assembly’s First Emergency Special Session, 
1.11.1957, UN Doc. A/PV.562, i.a. paras. 21 (Philippines), 43 (Syria), 186 (Ecuador), 314 (Union of South Africa), 337 
(Poland), 352 (Indonesia). 
34 See UNGA, Record of the Meetings, United Nations General Assembly’s First Emergency Special Session, 
1.11.1957, UN Doc. A/PV.562, para. 201. 
35 See Willner, The 1975 Congressional Feasibility Study on “Oil Fields as Military Objectives”, in: The Journal of 
the Middle East and Africa 2018, 127. 
36 Arguing, the last “real” water war broke out 4500 years ago between the Mesopotamian city-states Lagash 
and Umma, see: Water Conflict Chronology List, http://www2.worldwater.org/conflict/list/, 25.04.2019; Magsig, 
International Water Law and the Quest for Common Security, 2015, 20; Neuber/Scheumann, Kein Blut für 
Wasser, in: Internationale Politik 2003, 31 – 38; Kunig, Konflikte um das Wasser – Was sagt das Völkerrecht, 
https://www.fu-berlin.de/presse/publikationen/fundiert/archiv/2004_02/04_02_kunig/index.html, 
25.04.2019. 
37 For the latest call in the media to “scrap the Indus Water Treaty” after the armed conflict between India and 
Pakistan in 2019, see JhunJhunwala, Scrap the Indus Water Treaty, http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/a-leaf-from-
history-tribute-to-those-who-saved-ladakh/, 25.04.2019: “[…] we should consider using water as an instrument 




may be expected between Ethiopia and Egypt over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam at the Blue Nile. In all those cases, there is a certain discrepancy between the 
UN Charter regime and the official rhetoric of certain states which may contribute to processes of 
norm erosion. 
3. Initiating Processes of Norm Erosion 
Processes of norm erosion may, inter alia, be initiated by certain argumentative techniques. These 
techniques include arguments of securitization and legitimacy. Securitization can be described as a 
process of turning something into an existential threat for a community thereby justifying 
exceptional measures. Turning a policy field into a matter of national security had been the “key to 
legitimizing the use of force” because “traditionally, by saying ‘security’, a state representative 
declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to 
block a threatening development.”38  
a) Invoking Arguments of Securitization and Legitimacy 
In this context, a securitization of access to natural resources arguably takes place. Such a 
securitization can, for example, be seen in the context of “energy security”. States prepare for 
resource scarcity in think tanks and official publications by turning it into a matter of national 
security. For this line of argument, they can rely on well-established perceptions. For instance, 
already in 1984, the ECJ found that petroleum products are of fundamental importance for the 
existence of a country and therefore affect public security. 39 Today, many national security 
strategies predict a rise of conflicts due to water scarcity as well as an increased risk for energy 
security because resources for energy production are imported from countries considered 
unstable. The strategies often use language that includes the vague possibility of deploying forces 
or intervening to secure resources.40 
Securitization is frequently linked to legitimacy arguments which are related to concepts of self-
preservation and preserving defence capabilities when it comes to access to natural resources. In 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of war. The total river water available in Pakistan is 145 million acre feet (MAF). Of this the Indus river system 
provides 113 MAF. India allocated the water of three […] rivers totalling 80 MAF to Pakistan under the Indus 
Water Treaty” and Prakash, Abrogate Indus Water Treaty, https://www.thehansindia.com/posts/index/My-
Voice/2019-03-06/Abrogate-Indus-Water-Treaty/508347, 25.04.2019. 
38 Buzan/Waever/de Wilde, Security – A New Framework for Analysis, 1988, 21. 
39 ECJ, Judgement, 10.07.1984, Campus Oil Limited et. al. v Minister for Industry and Energy et. al., Case 72/83, 
ECR 1984, 2751 (para. 34): “It should be stated in this connection that petroleum products, because of their 
exceptional importance as an energy source in the modern economy, are of fundamental importance for a 
country's existence since not only its economy but above all its institutions, its essential public services and 
even the survival of its inhabitants depend upon them.” 
40 See e.g. Henken, Knapper werdende Rohstoffe – Eine Quelle für Aufrüstungen und Kriegsplanungen, in: 
Österreichisches Studienzentrum für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Von kalten Energiestrategien zu heißen 
Rohstoffkriegen?, 2008, 203 et seqq.; NATO, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm, 
25.04.2019, paras. 13, 15, 19 (indent 13); Germany, Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik, 2016, 41, 42, 50; UK, National 
Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, 2015, 21, 44; US, National Security Strategy, 
2017, 22-23; France, Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017, 2017, 29 et seq.; Russia, Russian 
National Security Strategy, http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/ 
Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf, 25.04.2019, paras. 13, 57, 61; China, China’s Military Strategy, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_20820628.htm etc, 25.04.2019. 




the literature, it is already claimed that securing resources, in particular water, is a legitimate 
ground for using force.41 Based on just war theories, it has been argued in moral terms that  
“[g]uided by a broad rationale that a secure state is a morally better alternative to a failed 
state, which is the presumed outcome of a serious strategic threat, the defence of a 
resource, even a downstream water supply […] appears plausible.”42 
Arguments of “self-preservation” refer to an overall concept of necessity where all means are valid 
for a state when the very existence of itself and its people are at stake. In this sense, resources 
such as water are usually tied to the most basic needs of life. Other resources, such as oil, are as 
well seen to be necessary for manufacturing and transporting goods as well as providing energy.43 
Moreover, in light of the importance of strategic resources, an intervention aimed at the 
preservation of defence capabilities alludes to a kind of pre-emptive use of force. The rationale 
behind this argument follows the idea that when a state is deprived of its necessary resources 
through actions by a third state, this hostile act might aim at lowering the defence capability of the 
state. As a result, and after a certain time, this third state could then easily take over the other 
state.44 
Arguments on the legitimacy of the use of force open space for legal development in this respect. 
Where states rely on legitimacy arguments they (implicitly) challenge the positive law or claim that 
under exceptional circumstance the law does not apply to them. Such claims may incite legal 
developments which aim to reduce the dissonance between legality and legitimacy.45 However, 
Art. 2 (4) UN Charter contains an absolute prohibition of the use of force. Since the prohibition is a 
fundamental principle of international law as ius cogens, each exception to it requires high 
scrutiny to avoid that the prohibition will be deprived of its function. Therefore, one must be 
cautious about whether existing legal conditions are in general open for broadening exceptions 
and thereby contributing to processes of norm erosion, even if legitimate grounds could morally 
justify the use of force. Securing of resources as a legitimate reason for using force may either be 
justified by a Security Council authorization under Chapter VII (b), as use of self-defence (c) or 
under the concept of necessity (d). 
b) UN Security Council Authorization under Chapter VII 
The ability of the UN Security Council to authorize military force in disputes over natural resources 
is the alternative to unilateral and thus more destabilizing measures by states involved in such a 
conflict. In the exercise of these powers, Security Council involvement in disputes over natural 
resources may arise at three different stages of conflict. 
                                                        
41 Waddington, Reconciling Just War Theory and Water-Related Conflict, in: Int. J. Appl. Philos. 2012, 209.  
42 Waddington, Reconciling Just War Theory and Water-Related Conflict, in: Int. J. Appl. Philos. 2012, 201. 
43 Waddington, Reconciling Just War Theory and Water-Related Conflict, in: Int. J. Appl. Philos. 2012, 201 – 202, 
but arguing that economic hardships are much slower to drive a population to a breaking point than 
starvation and dehydration. 
44 Cf. Sinnot-Armstrong, Preventive War, What is it good for?, in: Shue/Rodin, Preemption – Military Action and 
Moral Justification, 2007, 214. 
45 Marauhn, The International Rule of Law in Light of Legitimacy Claims, in: Krieger/Nolte/Zimmermann, The 
International Rule of Law - Rise or Decline, forthcoming, quoting: Popovsky, Legality and Legitimacy of 
International Criminal Tribunals, in: Falk/Juergensmeyer/Popovsky, Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs, 
2012, 407; on dissonance reduction as a driving force for legal change see Reinold, The Prohibition on the Use 
of Force: Plus ça change? Toward a theory of global normative change, in: Krieger/Liese, A Metamorphosis of 
International Law, forthcoming. 




aa) Disputes over Natural Resources 
In one scenario, conflicts over resources are already in a state of military conflict or are about to 
develop into this direction. In such cases, the Security Council is acting within its primary 
responsibility to preserve peace. A case in point is the conflict over the Heglig oil field between 
Sudan and South Sudan in 2012. 46 Acting under Chapter VII UN Charter, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 2046 in which the Council  
“decided that Sudan and South Sudan shall unconditionally resume negotiations, ... in 
consultation with relevant international partners, but within no more than two weeks from 
the time of adoption of this resolution, to reach agreement on […inter alia] arrangements 
concerning oil and associated payments”.47  
In such a constellation, the Security Council would be the competent body to even authorize the 
use of force to enforce its resolutions. 
In a second scenario, a military conflict is not immediate but a political dispute about the 
allocation of resources exists. In view of the wide and unspecific concept of “threat” to peace, it 
remains questionable as to what extent measures under Chapter VII could be taken in such a case. 
A wide conception of “threat to peace” would involve general threats that entail only a distant risk 
of leading to armed conflict. In this respect, competencies and functions of the Security Council 
under Chapter VII UN Charter have constantly been widened. Based on a substantive definition of 
peace, the Security Council has, inter alia, broadened its activities to deal with threats to peace 
into the early stages of conflict prevention even under Chapter VII. Since Resolution 688, the 
determination of a threat to peace moves away from direct threat of inter-state military conflict 
and covers general risks including the illegal exploitation of resources, for example in cases of 
trade with conflict diamonds.48 Whilst previous Security Council resolutions clearly dealt with the 
role of resources in fuelling existing armed conflicts49, a wider forward displaced concept of “threat 
to peace” would be consistent with such a trend.  
An early Security Council involvement under Chapter VII may foster multilateral solutions for 
resource conflicts because it can serve as a back-up for other dispute settlement fora including 
bilateral negotiations, arbitration or involvement of other actors such as the World Bank offering 
good services. Coordinated activities between diverse international institutions may thus 
efficiently bring together reluctant dispute parties.  
However, an involvement of the UN Security Council in political disputes over the allocation of 
natural resources affects the diluted relationship between Chapter VI and Chapter VII UN Charter.50 
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Such disputes will, generally, qualify as “dispute […] likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security” under Art. 33 UN Charter or as a “situation which might lead to 
international friction” under Art. 34 UN Charter. While, in its practice, the UN Security Council has 
seldom clearly differentiated between separate stages of a conflict, the UN Charter wording 
assumes that the far-reaching Chapter VII powers depend on the existence of a higher risk of 
military conflict.  
Indeed, in cases of disputes over natural resources, a certain restraint in the exercise of Security 
Council competences under Chapter VII seems appropriate. On the one hand, it is conceivable that 
the Security Council could, for example, legislatively appropriate a disputed transboundary water 
system (even in disregard of existing legal frameworks), place it under neutral control till the 
dispute is settled or even authorize the use of force to enforce the appropriation.51 On the other 
hand, considerations of efficiency should not lose out of sight that other actors are primarily 
competent to deal with non-military disputes over natural resources. Natural resource 
management is covered by a State’s permanent sovereignty over natural resources and primarily 
falls under the legal framework of international trade, development, and energy law. Ensuring 
equal access to resources through free trade and resulting disputes belong before the dispute 
settlement bodies of the WTO.52 The administration of transboundary watercourses does not only 
concern international environmental law but also development law. The World Bank had, for 
instance, a major influence on the conclusion of the Indus Water Treaty.53 Accordingly, Art. 2 (3) and 
33 (1) UN Charter stipulate that the competences of the Security Council even in the realm of the 
pacific settlement of disputes are only subsidiary. This “fundamental policy rule” allocates 
responsibility for dispute settlement between the parties and the UN. 54  After all, an early 
involvement of the Security Council may question the efficiency of the various tools of dispute 
settlement as it might entail the search for a “guilty party” to impose sanctions. This may, in turn, 
undermine the basis for trustful co-operation required for the allocation and administration of a 
shared resource and even further escalate the dispute at hand. As demonstrated by the 2012 Heglig 
oil crisis, Chapter VII powers are best employed to bring reluctant parties together for negotiations 
within the existing legal frameworks for resource allocation. 
bb) Root Causes of Armed Conflicts – Securitizing Resource Access before the UN Security 
Council 
Outside specific conflict scenarios the UN Security Council has dealt with access to resources as a 
root cause of armed conflict. Addressing root causes of armed conflicts has been part of the 
general development to extend the preventive powers of the Security Council. Thus, already in 
1992, the President of the Security Council issued a note on behalf of its members according to 
which 
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“the absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure 
international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, 
social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.”55  
Other, more generalized risks, such as climate change, drug trafficking as well as health crises, 
including HIV/AIDS and Ebola, have been addressed in the framework of thematic discussions, 
statements of the Security Council Presidency or under Arria-Formula meetings.56 Following the 
approach to deal with general threats, a securitization of the matter “access to resources” within 
the Security Council is evolving, even though, until now, no resolution had been passed. States try 
to address access to natural resources in meetings on “water and peace”57 or “climate change”58 as 
well as on the “role of natural resources as root causes of conflict”59. Within the discussions, a wide 
majority of states would generally welcome to deal with this topic in the Security Council. The chair 
of the Global High-Level Panel on Water and Peace even stated, that the 
“[d]efense of water for the civilian populations by the affected populations themselves is a 
legitimate form of self-defence and can be legitimately assisted by military means. […] it 
should be within the reach of the Security Council to convey a sense of legitimacy to those 
military actions whose sole purpose is the protection of water sources and installations that 
are vital for civilian populations.”60 
Still, dealing with root causes of armed conflicts outside a specific conflict meets strong 
contestations, in particular by non-Western states. The intensity of such reservations depends on 
the policy fields concerned.61 
Strong opposition within the meetings comes from Russia as well as states that can be considered 
as rising powers in line with their more sceptical view of interventionist policies. Russia,62 China, 
and the G-7763 constantly argue that the topic is out of the scope of the Security Council. Moreover, 
according to Russia,  
“[t]o make natural resources a matter of international security, would […] shift the focus of 
international efforts towards a subjective search for “guilty parties’ and the subsequent 
probable imposition of military intervention in the parts of the world concerned.”64  
This securitization would, in the end, in the view of Russia, enable the matter “being regulated 
pursuant to the top-down principle and could also harm the interests of countries concerned”, 
instead of regulation by “mutually acceptable decisions within specialized organizations”. 65 
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Explicitly referring to processes of securitization, Brazil66 and India oppose to deal with climate 
change linked to international peace because, according to India, such a  
“securitization […] has significant downsides. A securitized approach risks pitting States into 
a competition, when cooperation is clearly the most productive avenue in tackling this 
threat. Thinking in security terms usually engenders overly militarized solutions to problems 
that inherently require non-military responses to resolve them. In short, it brings the wrong 
actors to the table. As the saying goes, if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a 
nail.”67  
In view of the contested nature of such a broad understanding of conflict prevention, the question 
arises as to which legal and policy limitations exist for aligning the matter of resource allocation 
with efforts to widen the interpretation of “threat to peace”. From a systematic perspective, the 
broadening of Security Council competences to deal with root causes of armed conflicts affects the 
allocation of competences between UN organs. The Security Council’s involvement in issues of 
resource allocations and scarcity touches upon the relationship between security and 
development. It thus interferes with the mandate of other UN bodies, in particular the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the General Assembly (Art. 60 UN Charter). At 
first glance, it is hard to deny that the massive effects of environmental degradation and resource 
scarcity on human life and health suggest considering these phenomena as threats to peace. If a 
country persisted to use or to stockpile resources in a manner that threatens human lives and 
livelihoods of other countries, the magnitude of the threat may allow the Security Council to act.68 
Yet, the ECOSOC and the General Assembly offer fora for negotiation which are, in general, more 
inclusive than the Security Council whose composition is for reasons of its efficiency non-inclusive. 
Aware of this critical interplay, the approach of the Security Council already is cautious and 
debates on threats to peace related to development issues try to be as inclusive as possible, 
allowing otherwise unrepresented states to be present.69  
For almost 25 years, efforts within the UN and, in particular, in the Security Council were directed at 
a change from a “culture of reaction to a culture of prevention”.70 Laudable attempts to address 
root causes of conflict as well as a focus on the presumed efficiency of the Council made concepts 
of a subsidiary competence of the Council in terms of conflict prevention look outdated. However, 
recent Security Council debates indicate that states, in particular from the Global South, re-
emphasize the subsidiary role of the Council in conflict prevention as well as the immediacy 
requirement in line with the traditional understanding of the Security Council as a subsidiary organ 
of last resort. This ensures that the far-reaching powers of the UN Security Council under Chapter 
VII are still limited to situations where there is an imminent threat of military conflict. 
c) Self-Defence to Secure Resources 
The treatment of access to resources and steady supply as a vital interest that is linked to the very 
existence of states could allow for claims to invoke self-defence. Whereas such claims cannot 
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override the existing normativity of self-defence, they can de facto influence the interpretation of 
Art. 51 UN Charter as subsequent state practice (Art. 31 (3) lit. b VCLT).  
aa) “Resource-War” Scenarios  
Scenarios where a certain deprivation of resources had been called an “act of war” or “aggression” 
constantly re-emerge in international relations. Especially in the context of water, states employ 
language reminiscent of Art. 51 UN Charter. The construction of a dam leading to a diversion of a 
river or reduction of the flow is sometimes seen as a ground to allow for the use of force. For 
instance, Israel’s water plans, especially the National Water Carrier Plan that was designed to carry 
water from the Jordan River and Sea of Galilee to the Negev, had been considered by the Arab 
Defence Council in 1960 as “aggressive acts against the Arabs that justify legitimate self-defense by 
every Arab state”.71 More recently, since 2016, India openly discusses using “water as a weapon” 
against Pakistan by cutting off the flow of rivers to Pakistan in reaction to terrorist attacks. 
Pakistan responded by considering any revocation of the Indus Water Treaty as an “act of war”.72 As 
well, in 2016, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declared that the deprivation of 
water by Armenia towards Azerbaijan in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region “must be regarded 
as ‘environmental aggression’ and seen as a hostile act by one State towards another”.73 Lastly, 
Ethiopia’s plans to construct the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam at the Blue Nile, had been 
heavily criticised by Egypt due to the possibility of a reduction of the flow of the Nile. In 2013, 
President Morsi declared: “If a single drop of the Nile is lost, our blood will be the alternative. We 
are not warmongers, but we will never allow anyone to threaten our security.”74  
bb) Art. 51 UN Charter and Non-Traditional Threats 
From a legal perspective, Art. 51 UN Charter requires that “an armed attack occurs”. The ordinary 
meaning of the term “armed” points towards a threat of military and kinetic nature.75 According to 
the travaux préparatoires, an “armed attack” was considered a “clear case of aggression”.76 It is 
widely accepted and supported by the ICJ that there is a cascading relationship between the use of 
force and an armed attack. As a minimum, an armed attack would, therefore, involve a certain 
gravity of the use of force.77 
A mere deprivation of resources would be non-military in nature. It would first and foremost be 
considered as an economic measure. Following the travaux préparatoires and subsequent UNGA 
Resolutions, political or economic force is generally not considered to constitute force in the 
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meaning of Art. 2 (4) UN Charter and would violate other norms of international law, such as the 
principle of non-intervention (Art. 2 (1), 2 (7) UN Charter). A Brazilian attempt to include “economic 
measures” into the text of Art. 2 (4) UN Charter had been rejected by two votes to twenty-six at 
Dumberton Oaks.78 The same would follow from a systematic interpretation because the UN Charter 
refers to the term “force” on all other occasions as “armed” force.79 If then economic coercion 
would not even amount to a use of force, it would also not amount to an armed attack. Thus, the 
UNGA’s Definition of Aggression refers to force as “armed force” and does not list “economic 
aggression”.80 Correspondingly, a proposal by Bolivia had been rejected within the negotiations to 
consider as an act of aggression  
“unilateral action to deprive a state of the economic resources derived from the fair practice 
of international trade, or to endanger its basic economy, thus jeopardizing the security of 
that state or rendering it incapable of acting in its own defence and co-operating in the 
collective defence of peace”.81 
Nevertheless, these arguments do not imply that force may not at all be exerted by non-military 
measures. The focus of the classification cannot solely lie on the means used but must take into 
consideration the scale and effects of measures. For instance, Art. 54 (1) AP I of the Geneva 
Conventions prohibits starvation as a method of warfare implying that militarily relevant uses of 
force are not restricted to weapons. Thus, the ICJ in various decisions held that the “use of force” is 
not restricted to any specific type of weapons.82 As “force” cannot be interpreted solely within the 
context of military means available during the draft of the UN Charter, from a teleological view, it 
must be assessed whether the measure used is comparable by scale and effects to traditional 
kinetic weapons.83 Criteria for such “non-military threats” being similar to military threats by scale 
and effects had been set up by the expert committee of the Tallinn Manual, assessing, inter alia, 
whether cyber-attacks could amount to a prohibited “use of force”. According to Rule 69 of the 
“Tallinn-Manual”, non-military operations would constitute a use of force when its scale and 
effects are comparable to “traditional operations”. Criteria include severity in terms of damage, 
destruction, harm and death, immediacy of the effects of an attack and directness in terms of the 
causal connection.84 
cc) “Resource-War” Scenarios and Traditional Threats 
In view of these criteria, resource-wars involving water and/or resource scarcity and deprivation do 
not amount to a use of force, let alone an armed attack in view of their exclusive economic or 
environmental character. Whilst deprivation of economic resources such as water could meet the 
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threshold of severity because water scarcity could arguably lead to the death of many people, one 
could already be more sceptical when it comes to the deprivation of other economic resources 
such as oil. Even though deprivation of the latter could in very extreme situations lead to an 
economic collapse of industrialized countries and in the end, stop the production of means for a 
country’s existence, such resources in most circumstances can be replaced by other resources. 
Given that resource scarcity is a problem of availability of resources in one’s country, availability of 
such resources on the global market as well as a state’s capacity to acquire such resources must be 
taken into account: The lack of resources supplied from one country will often open the possibility 
of either to surrogate resources or to diversify the supplying countries. Thus, all the scenarios set 
out would likely not reach the comparability-threshold to military threats. Lowering the flow of a 
shared river by the construction of a dam or diversion of rivers – as it is the case in the 
India/Pakistan or Egypt/Ethiopia conflict – would not reach the immediacy criterion. First, 
technical means require large preparation and do not take place from one day to another. 
Secondly, even if a river would have been fully blocked by a dam and diverted, the effect would not 
be sudden but occur within weeks, leaving time for a peaceful settlement by relevant UN bodies 
including the involvement of the Security Council.  
Even in cases where the deprivation of resources aims at lowering the defence capabilities of a 
state, it is hard to argue that the aim to lower defence capabilities would amount to an armed 
attack just because one state denies access to resources to another state (notwithstanding, that 
the intention is hard to prove). As such, the immediacy criterion underlines the ultima ratio 
character of self-defence. As long as there are still pacific means available, self-defence is 
impermissible.  
d) Necessity and the Use of Force 
If not covered by the invocation of self-defence, the remaining justification to which official 
statements occasionally refer is the overall state of necessity which allows for the use of force. 
Processes of securitization at the national level allude to legitimacy arguments which rely on 
emergency actions to cope with a threat that touches upon vital interests of states. Policy 
statements and academic literature sometimes argue that the use of force would be permissible 
when “vital interests” or the very survival of a state are at stake.85 This is exemplified by Egypt’s 
declaration following plans to build a Dam at the Blue Nil that “all options are open” to stop a 
reduction of “even one drop of Nile water”.86 When it comes to other resources than water, the 
term “economic strangulation” was partly invoked as justification for a use of force. A US-Senate 
feasibility study in the aftermath of the Oil Crisis was arguing from an international law 
perspective, that it is indeed hard to justify any seizure of oil fields.87 Nevertheless, for allies of the 
US, the study explicitly mentioned the invocation of “self-preservation” to break an embargo by 
force and finally found that “[t]hose who view law as flexible instruments may find 
rationalizations”.88  
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In a modern variance, claims of necessity may be bolstered by a state’s human rights obligations. 
The state would justify using force to secure resources by referring to its obligations to provide for 
its population’s basic needs under relevant human rights treaties. For instance, the right to water 
obliges states, i.a. to ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water, that is sufficient 
and safe for personal and domestic uses to prevent disease.89 To fulfil such obligations towards its 
population, a state may claim to have no other choice than to use force. Such a line of argument is 
structurally related to the concept of a Responsibility to Protect or humanitarian intervention and 
would rely on just war theories mentioned above. However, from the perspective of human rights 
law, it is hardly conceivable that a positive obligation cumulates into a right to use force against 
other states to provide adequate resources, if it is at all legally coherent with human rights 
doctrine. From the perspective of the UN Charter, such an interpretation would conflict with 
Art. 103 UN Charter. Anyway, such a claim would most likely face the same normative problems as 
humanitarian interventions in general or a right to invoke necessity. 
The right to invoke necessity as a ground for the use of force refers to the idea of self-preservation 
and relies on an assumed right of existence of states.90 Whether a State may use force in 
accordance with the plea of necessity is highly uncertain and subject to a controversial 
discussion.91 In contrast to self-defence, the concept of necessity applies even in view of another 
state’s legal behaviour, since it is grounded solely on the telos of self-preservation.92 The ICJ 
Advisory Opinion on the use of nuclear weapons may be regarded as an affirmation of a right of a 
state to survival. In the Advisory Opinion, the ICJ held that  
“it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear 
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which its very survival 
would be at stake”.93  
But even if such a right would exist, it is more than doubtful that necessity could at all justify a use 
of force in view of the absolute character of Art 2 (4) UN Charter. As the only exception Bowett, for 
instance, refers to the UK’s comment on the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of States. In this 
comment, the UK claims that there may be exceptions where a state is pursuing a course which 
leads to the “economic strangulation of another state”.94  
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The Articles on State Responsibility (ASR) of the International Law Commission (ILC) formulated in 
its Art. 25 (1) ASR the invocation of necessity as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. 95 
According to Art. 25 (1) (b) ASR, necessity can only be invoked to sacrifice a lesser good to a greater 
emergency of a state. In this sense, non-compliance with peremptory norms cannot be justified by 
a state of necessity, as set out in Art. 26 ASR, because in  
“view of the compelling reasons which lead to the definitive affirmation of the prohibition of 
the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, it 
seems […] unconceivable that the legal conviction of States would today accept “necessity” 
as justification for a breach of that prohibition and, more generally, for an act covered by the 
now accepted concept of an “act of aggression”.”96  
Notwithstanding the existence of a right to self-preservation in the pre-UN Charter era, today, such 
a notion of self-preservation must be rejected due to the intent to abolish armed reprisals entirely: 
“Even in instances where a State faces absolute destruction, any forcible response must fall within 
the requirements of self-defence.” 97 Accordingly, the intention to abolish armed reprisals is 
reflected in Art. 50 (1) (a) ASR.  
A precedent for the reasonableness of rebuffing arguments of self-preservation can be seen in the 
wide denunciation of Japans justification for the war in the Pacific which was considered as a far-
reaching example for an abusive practice. At the time, a counsel at the Tokyo Trials argued:  
“To deprive a nation of those necessary commodities which enable its citizens and subjects 
to exist is surely a method of warfare not dissimilar to the violent taking of lives through 
explosives and force because it reduces opposition by delayed action resulting in defeat just 
as surely as through other means of conventional hostilities. It can even be said of a more 
drastic nature than the blasting of life by physical force, for it aims at the slow depletion of 
the morale and well-being of the entire civilian population through the medium of slow 
starvation.”98  
The judgement in the Tokyo Trials rejected this argument as non-consistent with Japan’s own 
practice and underlined in this sense the abusive nature of such an excuse: 
“The argument is merely a repetition of Japanese propaganda issued at the time she was 
preparing for her wars of aggression. It is not easy to have patience with its lengthy 
repetition at this date when documents are at length available which demonstrate Japan’s 
decision to expand to the North, to the West and to the South at the expense of her 
neighbors was taken long before any economic measures were directed against her and was 
never departed from.”99 
                                                        
95 Art. 25 (1) ASR: “Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an 
act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: a) Is the only way for the 
State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and b) Does not seriously impair 
an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international 
community as a whole.” 
96 ILC, Addendum – Eighth report on State responsibility by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/318/ADD.5-7, 21.  
97 Green, Self-Preservation, in: Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2009, para. 16.  
98 Taken from a citation of Judge Pal/India in his Dissenting Opinion, cf. Röling/Rüter, The Tokyo Judgement – 
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East – 29 April 1946 – 12 November 1948, Vol. II, 1977, 616. 
99 Röling/Rüter, The Tokyo Judgement – The International Military Tribunal for the Far East – 29 April 1946 – 12 
November 1948, Vol. I, 1977, 380 et seq. 




In sum, a concept of necessity that authorizes the use of force outside the UN Charter regime with 
regard to a resource necessity is neither supported by state practice nor reasonably compliant with 
the purposes of an abolishment of the use of force in international relations. Such an argument 
itself follows the principle of “necessity knows no law” and finds itself outside of any legal contexts 
of justification.100  
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, at the level of policy statements, there are some indications that processes of 
securitization involving the securing of natural resources may contribute to an erosion of the 
prohibition of the use of force. This risk arises in preparation for crises over access to resources 
and in statements that invoke self-defence or try to revive the concept of necessity on the grounds 
of survival of the state. This behaviour is taking place in grey areas of interpretation of 
international law and therefore needs strong objection by the international community to prevent 
such arguments from contributing to interpretative shifts on the basis of subsequent state practice 
or to the creation of exceptions to the prohibition on the basis of customary international law. 
Following the overall duty of peaceful settlement of disputes and the overall need for enduring 
cooperation to benefit equally from the shared water resources, states should support the already 
existing mechanisms of peaceful settlement.101 The strength and acceptance of exactly those 
mechanisms bolster and ensure the prohibition of the use of force. In this sense, it is a worrying 
and destabilising trend that some of these institutions are recently called into question. 102 
Nevertheless, with an increasing development of global supply chains by permanent installations, 
such as pipelines between Russia and Europe or the One Belt, One Road Project by China, one 
cannot foresee what states are willing to do to protect their investments. 
New interpretations of the prohibition of the use of force deterring from traditional interpretations 
always need to balance community interests in the non-use of force and the legitimate security 
interests of states.103 Every new exception questions the function of the prohibition of the use of 
force as a basic rule of international law and relations. Therefore, one should not risk weakening 
the prohibition of the use of force. Opening it up could lead to a run over natural resources that 
entails the inherent danger of abuses. As had been said by Kofi Annan with regards to the 
possibility of pre-emptive attack:  
“This logic represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however 
imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty-eight years. [I]f it were to 
                                                        
100 Cf. the speech of the Chancellor of the German Empire Bethmann-Hollweg at the Reichstag from 4th August 
1914, justifying the German invasion of Belgium in World War I: “We are in a state of legitimate defense. 
Necessity knows no law”, cited in: Editorial Comment, The Neutrality of Belgium, in: AJIL 1915, 709. 
101 For an overview, see Qureshi, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: An Analysis of the Indus Waters Treaty, in: 
Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 2018, 75 et seqq. 
102 After a U.S. campaign to block appointments and reappointments of judges to the WTO Appellate Body only 
four remained of seven, see Miles, World trade's top court close to breakdown as U.S. blocks another judge, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto-judge/world-trades-top-court-close-to-breakdown-as-us-
blocks-another-judge-idUSKCN1M621Y, 25.04.2019. 
103 Dörr, Use of Force, Prohibition of, in: Wolfrum, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2015, 
para. 51.  




be adopted, it could set precedents that resulted in a proliferation of the unilateral and 
lawless use of force, with or without justification.”104  
The same holds true for any justification of war over resources. Unilateral use of force leads most 
certainly to an escalation of conflict and thereby to global instability. If then the argument of 
instability of regions is used to intervene in another country again to secure access to key 
resources, one may foresee that the prohibition of the use of force becomes blurry and to the end 
ineffective. 
 
                                                        
104  Annan, The Secretary-General Address to the General Assembly, New York, September 23, 2003, 
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.htm, 25.04.2019. 
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